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SOCIAL INSTITUONS AND THE CRIME
"BUST" OF THE 1990s
GARY LAFREE"
I. INTRODUCTION
While scarcely visible behind the wave of media attention
devoted to crime, beginning in the early 1990s, researchers be-
gan to observe declining rates in violent and other serious forms
of crime in the United States. In this article, I begin by evaluat-
ing the size of these declines and comparing crime trends in the
1990s to crime trends in the U.S. since World War II. I also ex-
amine trends for different crime types and data sources, and for
large cities. My review shows that crime rates in the 1990s have
dropped rapidly and that declines have been sweeping, affecting
all of the street crimes that are routinely tracked by the two ma-
jor sources of crime data in the United States (the Uniform
Crime Reports and the National Crime Victimization Survey).
In short, the period from 1990 to 1997 represents the closest
thing to a sustained decline in crime, or a "crime bust" that the
United States has experienced in more than fifty years.
In a recently published book, I argue that changes in the le-
gitimacy of social institutions provide the most promising ex-
planation for the rapid changes in street crime trends observed
in America after World War II.' In particular, I argue that
American crime rates surged in the 1960s as a result of increas-
ing distrust of political institutions, increasing stress produced
by economic institutions, and declining strength of family insti-
tutions.2 American society countered this growing legitimacy
crisis by investing more in other institutions, most notably
Director, Institute for Social Research, University of New Mexico.
GARY LAFREE, LOSING LEGITIMACY: STREET CRIME AND THE DECLINE OF SOCIAL




criminal justice, education, and welfare. Stabilization in the le-
gitimacy of political, economic, and family institutions, and in-
vestments in criminal justice, education, and welfare eventually
produced downward pressure on crime rates. In this essay, I
consider the applicability of these arguments for the declines in
U.S. crime rates that have occurred during the first eight years
of the 1990s.
I concentrate here on the group of offenses popularly
known as "street crimes." While the term is imprecise, it has
generally come to include the familiar crimes of murder, rob-
bery, rape, aggravated assault, burglary, and larceny. Glaser
calls these crimes "predatory" because they all involve offenders
who "prey" on other persons or their property, while contrasting
these offenses with nonpredatory crimes like prostitution and
gambling." Predatory crimes are especially worthy of attention
because they generally evoke the greatest popular fear and con-
cern and draw the most universal condemnation from society.
Probably as a consequence of these characteristics, we have
more complete information on predatory crimes than on any
other crime types.
II. STREET CRIME TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES
Street crimes are all similar in that they each consist of an
offender, a victim, and at least for the crimes that are reported
or discovered, the involvement of police and other legal agents.
This, in turn, defines the crime data that may be collected: "of-
ficial" data collected by legal agents, "self report" data collected
from offenders, and "victimization" data collected from crime
victims. Because self report data are likely to be most reliably
collected for the least serious crimes,4 they are of less value for
the street crimes examined here, leaving us to rely almost exclu-
sively on either official or victimization data. Moreover, na-
tional crime victimization survey data in the United States have
only been collected on an annual basis since 1973. In the next
3 DANIEL GLASER, CRIME IN OUR CHANGING SocIETY 6 (1978).
'ROBERT O'BRIEN, CRIME AND VICTIMIZATION DATA 78 (1985).
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section, I examine street crime trends from official data and vic-
timization survey data for the 1990s.
A. STREET CRImE IN THE 1990s
The most comprehensive official data on street crime in the
United States come from the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR),
collected annually by the Federal Bureau of Investigation since
1930. Table 1 shows rates for the seven street crimes on which
data are most reliably compiled by the UCR, as well as totals for
violent crimes, and crimes to property, as well as all crimes, for
1990 and 1997.: The percentage change column indicates size-
able decreases in all seven crimes. The greatest percentage de-
clines are for murder, robbery, burglary, and motor vehicle
theft-all registered at least a 23% drop in the first eight years
of the 1990s. Percentage declines for rape, aggravated assault
and larceny have been somewhat less, but still sizeable. Taken
together, these seven crimes logged a 15.4% drop from 1990 to
1997.
National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) data have
been collected annually by the Bureau of Justice Statistics since
1973.6 The NCVS includes the same street crimes as the UCR
with two exceptions: NCVS data do not report murders, and
NCVS data distinguish between aggravated and simple assaults.
Table 2 shows rates for seven street crimes collected by the
NCVS for 1990 and 1996. Although there are substantial differ-
ences by crime type, the NCVS data, like the UCR data, show
declines in all seven street crimes reported. Declines from the
'UCR data includes only murders that are intentional-as opposed to uninten-
tional killings, such as those resulting from negligence. The UGR includes robberies
in which property was seized from another person by violence or intimidation. UCR
rape cases include crimes of unlawful, nonconsensual sexual intercourse. Aggravated
assaults in the UGR include cases in which individuals confront others with the inten-
tion of causing them serious physical injury. They are "aggravated" if they are ac-
companied by a deadly weapon or with an intent to kill, rob or rape. Burglaries in
the UCR include cases in which individuals break into someone's home with the in-
tention of committing a crime, most commonly, theft. Thefts in the UGR refer simply
to stealing someone else's property.





STREET CRIME RATES PER 100,000 U.S. INHABITANTS,
1990 AND 1996, UCR DATA.
Crime 1990 1996 Percent
Change
Murder 9.4 6.8 -27.7
Rape 41.2 35.9 -12.9
Robbery 257.0 186.1 -27.6
Aggravated Assault 424.1 382.0 -9.9
Violent Crimes 731.7 610.8 -16.5
Burglary 1,235.9 919.6 -25.6
Larceny 3,194.8 2,886.5 -9.6
Motor Vehicle Theft 657.8 503.8 -23.1
Property Crimes 5,088.5 4,311.9 -15.3
Total Crimes 5,820.2 4,922.7 -15.4
Note: Data from U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime
Reports, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1990, 1997.
NCVS data are greatest for the three property crimes-all show-
ing more than a 20% drop. Among violent crimes, rape rates
show the greatest percentage decline 17.6%. Simple assaults
show the least change, declining by only a little more than 1%.
To assess how broad-gauged declines in national street
crime rates in the 1990s have been, I next examined changes in
crime rates for ten of the nation's largest cities from 1990 to
1995. Using UCR data, I calculated crime rates per 100,000 citi-
zens for the seven crimes reported in Table 1 for Boston, Chi-
cago, Dallas, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, New York,
Philadelphia, Phoenix, and San Diego. Crime rates for the
seven crimes in these ten cities produced a total of sixty-nine
contrasts between 1990 and 1995. 7 Of these sixty-nine contrasts,
sixty (87.0%) showed that crime rates had decreased. The size
7 Data on rape cases were missing for Chicago.
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TABLE 2.
STREET CRIME RATES PER 1,000 POPULATION,
AGE 12 AND OVER, 1990 AND 1996, NCVS DATA.
1329
Crime 1990 1996 Percent
Change
Rape 1.7 1.4 -17.6
Robbery 5.7 5.2 -8.8
Aggravated Assault 9.8 8.8 -10.2
Simple Assault 26.9 26.6 -1.1
Total Violent Crime 44.1 42.0 -4.8
Burglary 64.5 47.2 -26.8
Larceny 263.8 205.7 -22.0
Motor Vehicle Theft -20.6 13.5 -34.5
Total Property Crime 348.9 266.3 -23.7
Note: Data for 1990 from Michael R. Rand, et al, CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION 1973 - 95 (1997); data for 1996 from C. Ringel,
CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 1996 (1997).
of decreases were typically much greater than the size of in-
creases. For example, from 1990 to 1995, burglary rates de-
clined by 51.0% in Dallas, 45.7% in Houston, and 40.7% in San
Diego. By contrast, for the one city that recorded increases in
robbery from 1990 to 1995 (Philadelphia), rates increased by
10.2%."
For all seven crimes, a majority of cities reported declining
crime rates from 1990 to 1995. Thus, all ten cities reported de-
clining murder and burglary rates, nine cities reported declin-
ing robbery and motor vehicle theft rates, eight cities reported
declining rape rates, and seven cities reported declining aggra-
vated assault and larceny rates.
8The biggest exception to these general trends was for homicide rates in Phoenix.
In 1990, with a population of 983,403, Phoenix reported 128 homicide and non-
negligent manslaughter cases. In 1995, with a population of 1,085,706, Phoenix re-
ported 214 homicide and non-negligent manslaughter cases-an increase of 51.5%.
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Taken together, data from both the UCR and the NCVS
strongly support the conclusion that there have been substan-
tial, broad-based declines in street crime rates during the first
half of the 1990s. The UCR national data suggest that the de-
clines have been greatest for murder, robbery, and burglary
data show the largest decreases for motor vehicle theft, burglary,
and larceny. City-level data from the UCR confirm that declines
can also be observed in most cases for the nation's largest cities,
especially for murder, robbery, rape, burglary, and motor vehi-
cle theft. I will now consider how the magnitude of the recent
crime decreases compares to earlier crime trends in the post-
World War II United States.
B. PUTTING THE RECENT DowNTuRNs INTO CONTEXT
NCVS data allow us to examine annual trends only from
1973 to 1996. I use UCR data to examine street crime trends
from 1946 to 1996.
1. NCVS Data, 1973-1996
Figure 1 shows trends for the four violent crimes tracked by
the NCVS from 1973 to 1996. Trends for these four crimes pro-
vide considerable but not total support for the idea of a crime
"bust" during the 1990s. The best case for a rapid decline in the
1990s can be made for rape cases and aggravated assault cases.
Rape rates declined by 36.4% from 1991 to 1996 and aggravated
assault rates declined by 27.3% from 1993 to 1996. These were
the steepest declines in the years included in the NCVS data.
Similarly, from 1994 to 1996, simple assault rates exhibited the
greatest three-year decline (14.5%) since data collection began
in 1973-although simple assault rates were only slightly lower
in 1996 (26.6) than they had been in 1990 (26.9).
Although robbery rates fell considerably during the 1990s,
they declined even more rapidly during the 1980s.
Taken together, rates for robbery and aggravated assault
were lower in 1996 than at any other point spanned by the
twenty-four years of NCVS data. The lowest level of reported
rapes was recorded in 1995. While the lowest NCVS level of
1330 [Vol. 88
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simple assaults occurred in 1986 (25.3), the levels were similar
to those recorded for simple assaults in 1996 (26.6).
Figure 2 shows trends in the three property crimes included
in the NCVS data from 1973 to 1996. Data on property crimes
are consistently supportive of a 1990s crime bust. In fact, for
burglaries, the declines began well before the 1990s, starting in
about 1981. Altogether, burglary rates from NCVS data
dropped by 55.4% from 1981 to 1996-with about half of this
decline occurring in the decade of the 1990s. Similarly, theft
rates began to drop consistently in the late 1970s, declining by
more than 50.0% from 1979 to 1996. The case of motor vehicle
theft is more complex: motor vehicle theft rates declined slowly
from 1973 to 1985, increased substantially from 1986 to 1991,
and then began to decline again in 1992, reaching their lowest
level in 1996. All three of the property crimes included in the
NCVS were lower in 1996 than they had been at any time since
the NCVS started collecting annual data in 1973.
2. UCRData, 1946 to 1997
To put crime trends for the 1990s in a broader historical
context, I next present post-World War II trends (1946-1997
based on UCR data for the violent crimes of murder, rape, rob-
bery, and aggravated assault; and for the property crimes of
burglary, theft, and motor vehicle theft. Figure 3 shows trends
for the four violent crimes tracked by the UCR.
As we saw in Table 1 above, all four of these violent crimes
declined during the 1990s. In this section, I compare the recent
declines in these crimes to earlier postwar trends.
U.S. murder rates in 1997were at their lowest level since
1967. From 1990 to 1997 murder rates declined by 27.7%-the
largest decline in postwar history. The only other period in
postwar U.S. history with comparable declines in murder rates
happened from 1980 to 1984 (a 22.5% drop). But so far at
least, murder rates in the 1990s are not decreasing as fast as they
increased in the 1960s. For example, in the eight years from
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U.S. robbery rates in 1997 were at their lowest level since
1973. From 1990 to 1997, robbery rates fell by 27.6%-the fastest
decline in more than fifty years. The next greatest decline in
robbery rates only once during the postwar period was the five
years from 1981 to 1984, which witnessed a 20.6% decline. As
with murder rates, robbery rates so far have not declined as rap-
idly in the 1990s as they increased in the 1960s and early 197 0s.
Thus, from 1963 to 1975, robbery rates increased by an incredi-
ble 257.3%.
Figure 3 shows that while recent decreases in rape and ag-
gravated assault rates are less than those for murder and rob-
bery rates, they are still substantial. In fact, declines in rates of
rape and aggravated assault in the 1990s, like those for murder
and robbery, represent the largest declines in UCR rates thus
far recorded during the postwar period.
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Figure 4 shows UCR trends for three property crimes from
1946 to 1997. The clearest downward trend is for burglaries.
Burglary rates in 1997 have not been lower since 1967. Since
reaching a peak in 1980, burglary rates have declined by 45.4%.
The declines from 1990 to 1997 (25.6%) were greater than
those recorded from 1980 to 1986 (20.2%). Percentage de-
clines for burglary in the 1990s have still been somewhat less
than percentage increases in the 1970s. Injust three years, from
1972 to 1975, burglary rates increased by 34.3%.
Motor vehicle theft has also shown substantial declines dur-
ing the 1990s (23.1% from 1990 to 1997). This represents the
largest percentage decline in motor vehicle theft observed dur-
ing the past fifty years. Still, these declines are not as large as
the increases in motor vehicle theft witnessed during the 1960s.
Thus, from 1961 to 1967 rates of motor vehicle theft increased
by 82.0%.
Of the street crimes tracked by the UCR, rates of larceny
have declined the least during the 1990s (9.6%). In percentage
terms, the greatest recorded postwar decline in larceny hap-
pened from 1980 to 1984 (an 11.9% drop). Moreover, larceny
rates in the 1990s are not declining as quickly as they increased
throughout most of the 1960s and 1970s.
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The UCR data support two main conclusions about crime
trends in the 1990s. First, the declines in crime recorded from
1990 to 1997 have been substantial. Thus far, the 1990s have
witnessed the greatest recorded percentage drop of the postwar
period for the violent street crimes of murder, rape, robbery,
and aggravated assault, and the property crimes of burglary and
motor vehicle theft. The only exception is for larceny, which
declined slightly faster in the 1980s than in the 1990s.
Second, thus far at least, the pace of recent decreases in
these seven street crimes has not been as great as the speed at
which they increased during the 1960s and 1970s. Nevertheless,
1990s trends clearly represent the closest thing to a crime bust
that the U.S. has witnessed since the end of World War II.
Moreover, we do not yet know how great the declines in these
crimes eventually will be. As this article was being prepared, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation released UCR data showing that
during the first six months of 1998, violent crime in the United
States fell by another 7.0% and property crime by another
5.0% .9
3. Explaining the 1990s Crime Bust
Taken together, these postwar street crime trends provide
us with at least three important clues about the 1990s decline in
crime rates. First, substantial decreases have happened in a
relatively short period. During the first eight years of the 1990s,
UCR rates of murder, robbery, and burglary all fell by more
than 25.0%. Total UCR violent crimes fell by 16.5% and total
property crimes fell by 15.3%. During the same period, NCVS
data show more than a 20.0% drop in rates of burglary, larceny,
and motor vehicle theft, and more than a 10.0% drop in rates of
rape and aggravated assault. Thus, we are looking for crime ex-
planations that are capable of accounting for rapid change.
Second, while there is considerable variation across crime
types, the declines are extremely broad-based. Thus, there have
been measurable declines in the 1990s for all seven crimes re-
9 Federal Bureau of Investigation Press Release (Dec. 13, 1998) (on file with the
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology).
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ported by the UCR and for all seven crimes reported by the
NCVS. These patterns suggest that we are looking for a general
explanation that has implications for many different types of
street crime.
And finally, the recent declines in crime are clearly time
specific; that is, all of the street crimes tracked by the UCR and
the NCVS have registered declines in the 1990s. In fact, for
most of these crimes, the declines during the 1990s have been
the largest observed during the past fifty years. Therefore, we
must ask what it is about the 1990s that encouraged declining
crime rates. In the remainder of this paper, I concentrate on
the role played by institutional legitimacy in bringing about the
recent decreases in crime rates.
III. CRIME AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE 1990s
As used here, "institutions" are the patterned, mutually
shared ways that people develop for living together.'0 These
patterns include the norms, values, statuses, roles, and organiza-
tions that define and regulate human conduct. Institutions en-
compass proper, lawful, expected modes of behavior." They are
guides to how we should live and conduct our affairs; daily re-
'minders of the conduct that we hold to be either acceptable or
unacceptable. 2 "Legitimacy" refers to the ease or difficulty with
which institutions are able to get societal members to follow mu-
tually shared rules, laws, and norms."5
Institutions are arguably the most important of all human
creations. They allow societies to endure over time as individu-
als join or are replaced by new members. Thus, institutions for
humans serve the same purpose as instincts do for other species:
'G LAFREE, supra note 1, at 70-90 (1998); see also ROBERT BELLAH, ET AL., THE GOOD
SoCIErY 4 (1991).
" See generally Talcott Parsons, The Motivation of Economic Activities, CANADIAN J.
ECON. & PoL Sci. 187-203 (1940).
12 BELLAH ET AL., supra note 10, at 12.
" This definition of legitimacy follows Max Weber, who points out that while le-
gitimacy may be grounded in moral validity, individuals may also attribute legitimacy
to institutional rules for other reasons, including fear of punishment, respect for tra-
dition, religious beliefs, or simple expediency. MAx WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS 324-63 (1947).
1998] 1349
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they channel our behavior into forms that help us satisfy basic
collective and individual needs. In fact, because humans have
relatively underdeveloped instincts, they are especially depend-
ent on institutions for survival. 5 Instead of relying on messages
genetically transmitted from the past, humans are guided in
large part by institutional rules that are passed from one genera-
tion to the next.1
6
This dependence on institutions has important implications
for all human behavior, including crime. On the one hand, it
allows behavior to change rapidly in response to environmental
changes. But because institutions are little more than socially
constructed agreements, they are fragile, at least compared to
the "hard wired" responses produced by biological instincts.
A. How INSTITUTIONS REGULATE CRIME
In general, institutions control crime in three interrelated
ways: by reducing individual motivation to commit crime, by
supplying effective controls to curb criminal behavior, and by
providing individuals with protection against the criminal be-
havior of others.17 Because institutions are primarily responsible
for teaching children moral behavior, they have a direct linkage
to our motivation to commit crime. The most obvious institu-
tional connection here is the family. Through socialization,
families teach children the differences between appropriate and
inappropriate conduct. These lessons are enforced by social
sanctions, both positive and negative. For example, families re-
inforce acceptable behavior with praise, love, and support, while
punishing unacceptable behavior with criticism, ostracism, and
expulsion.
The impact of institutions on reducing criminal motivation
is not limited to families. In industrialized nations such as the
U.S., educational institutions are increasingly important in this
regard. Moreover, economic and political institutions may re-
" PETER L. BERGER, INVITATION TO SOCIOLOGY: A HUMANISTIC PERSPECIVE 87-91
(1963).
" PETER BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SociAL LIFE 277 (1964).
17 See generally LAFREE, supra note 1, at 70-90.
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duce individual motivation to commit crime simply by convinc-
ing individuals that these institutions" are, fair, just, and worthy of
respect.
Institutions also regulate behavior by providing social con-
trol. As used here, "social control" refers to the mechanisms
aimed at compelling individuals to adhere to institutional
rules."' Social control is extremely broad and far reaching in its
effects.19 It tells us what crime is, how we are to respond to it,
and what is right and wrong about it.
Social control further can be divided into informal and
formal sources.20 "Informal" social control refers to sanctions
imposed by individuals or groups who are not acting directly on
behalf of official political agencies, and includes especially the
influence of family, friends, and neighborhood residents. By
contrast, formal social control refers to the control of individu-
als that are acting on behalf of official legal and political agen-
cies, including especially police, judges, prison guards, and
prosecutors.
Granovetter uses the term "embeddedness" to describe the
social relations that link individuals to institutions and thereby
regulate their behavior.21 Embeddedness provides a useful
metaphor for how social control works. Most individuals are
embedded in a complex web of social connections that will ei-
ther make them think long and hard before engaging in crime,
or simply provide enough surveillance to make criminal behav-
ior more difficult. For most people, the first social hurdles to
crime are informal: the potential embarrassment they will face
when their misdeeds become known to their families-spouse,
children, parents, and other relatives. Beyond the family, there
is the shame associated with those with whom they work or at-
" RobertJ. Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Col-
lective Efficacy, 277 SCI. 918 (1997).
19 Locations, types, and forms of social control have generated a complex research
literature. See generally DAVID H. BAYLEY, SOCIAL CONTROL AND POLIICAL CHANGE 16
(1985).
'" While this distinction is useful for my purposes, it is not without difficulties. For
a discussion of these difficulties, see id. at 18-20.
"' Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness,
91 AM.J. Soc. 481 (1985).
1998] 1351
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tend school, members of their church or military company, civic
or fraternal organizations to which they belong, and so on. Fi-
nally, in addition to all of these informal sources of social con-
trol, there is the formal legal system itself, with its threats of
arrest, legal processing, and punishment. Most individuals,
then, are embedded in social networks that usually serve to
channel their behavior down noncriminal paths.
In addition to regulating the motivation to commit crime
and surrounding individuals with social controls, institutions
also reduce crime by directly protecting individuals from crimi-
nal victimization. Families, communities, businesses, and
schools play an important role in terms of guarding their indi-
vidual members from the criminal behavior of others. Likewise,
criminal justice institutions, especially the police, are justified in
large part by their ability to protect citizens from crime.
In general, then, institutions suppress crime by enmeshing
individuals in social systems that reduce their motivation to
commit crime, by increasing the effectiveness of those who are
informally or formally expected to regulate their criminal be-
havior, and by protecting individuals from the criminal behavior
of others. In a smoothly functioning society, these elements are
inextricably related. Thus, individuals who are well socialized in
effect serve as their own social control agents. Strong social
control reduces motivation and the need for protection; weak
motivation makes social control and protection less important;
strong guardianship may compensate in part for high levels of
motivation and ineffective social control. Succinctly stated, as
institutions lose their ability to regulate their members, more
individuals will be more motivated to behave as they please, and
their behavior will be less successfully controlled by others, and
institutions will be less effective in protecting their members
from others who are behaving as they please.
B. IDENTIFYING THE MOST IMPORTANT INSTITUTIONS FOR CRIME CONTROL
If we think of institutions as nothing more than shared rules
that regulate human conduct in recurrent situations, We may
conclude that there are thousands (or even millions) of institu-
tions in any given society. But obviously, some institutions are
1352 [Vol. 88
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more important than others in terms of controlling criminal
behavior. The three institutions that probably have been linked
to crime most frequently by researchers and policy makers are
political, economic, and familial.
22
Political institutions are primarily responsible for mobilizing
and distributing resources for collective goals.2 They include
the entire governmental apparatus: the legislature, the judiciary,
the military establishment, and the administrative ageniies that
implement governmental decisions. Political institutions have
direct responsibility for crime control and the lawful resolution
of conflicts. They are also responsible for maintaining social
order, providing channels for resolving conflicts, and protecting
citizens from foreign invasion.
Economic institutions are responsible for societal adapta-
tion to the environment.24 Economic institutions include those
organized around the production and distribution of goods and
services.25 The economy is responsible for satisfying the basic
material requirements for human survival: food, clothing, and
shelter. Economic institutions also include a stratification sys-
tem that ranks individuals in a social hierarchy of rewards and
responsibilities.
For centuries, families in human societies have been chiefly
responsible for the socialization of children. Coleman describes
family institutions as "primordial" because, unlike other institu-
tions, they are based in part on a social organization that devel-
ops through birth and blood ties. In addition, the family has
traditionally had primary responsibility for regulating the sexual
2While I concentrate here on three institutions that frequently have been linked
to crime by others, I do not argue that they are the only relevant institutions in con-
trolling crime. For example, religion, neighborhood and community organizations,
voluntary associations, and media and mass communication have all been suggested
as important determinants of crime trends. See LAFREE, supra note 1, at 70-90.
See BLATU, supra note 16, at 279; TALcOTr PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYsTEM (1951).
2' BLAU, supra note 16, at 278.
STEVEN F. MESSNER & RIcHARD ROSENFELD, CRIME AND ThE AmEucAN DREAM 73
(1994).




activity of its members, caring for and nurturing children, and
seeing to the needs of the infirm and the elderly.
Because they are human creations, institutions are con-
stantly evolving and changing, and newer institutions are being
created and expanded to support or supplant older ones. Post-
war America has responded to the declining legitimacy of po-
litical, economic, and familial institutions in part by
strengthening support for newer institutions. In particular, to
shore up political institutions, American society has funded ma-
jor increases in criminal justice spending; to reduce the delete-
rious consequences of a rapidly changing economy, American
society has spent more on welfare; and to help support declin-
ing family institutions, American society has invested heavily in
education.28 All three of these institutional responses have im-
portant implications for crime rates.
C. INSTITUTIONS AND CRIME IN THE 1990S
In the remainder of this paper, I briefly consider the links
between street crime declines in the 1990s, three traditional in-
stitutions2 (political, economic, and familial), and three institu-
tions (criminal justice, education, and welfare) that have
become increasingly important during the postwar years. In my
earlier book, I argued that the postwar American crime boom
occurred as a result of an institutional legitimacy crisis charac-
terized by (1) growing distrust of political institutions, (2) rising
economic stress, and (3) increasing disintegration of the fam-
ily.30 American society responded to this crisis by providing
greater support for criminal justice, education, and welfare in-
stitutions.3' If these same arguments hold for the 1990s, then
the crime bust should be accompanied by evidence of increas-
BEAu, supra note 16, at 278.
It would of course be simplistic to argue that these institutional responses were
narrow reactions to a single type of institutional decline. For example, welfare spend-
ing is justified not only in terms of reducing economic stress, but also in terms of
supporting the family and increasing trust in political institutions.
I use "traditional" here in the very limited sense of indicating institutions that
have customarily been thought to control or regulate crime.
30 LAFREE, supra note 1, at 70-90.
-, Id. at 85-86.
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ing trust in political institutions, declining economic stress, and
growing stability of families, as well as increasing support for
criminal justice, education, and welfare institutions.
In Figure 5, I summarize these expectations. I do not as-
sume that all of these institutional effects are equally important,
that all must be present to the same extent for crime rates to
decline, or that all must be absent to the same extent for crime
rates to increase. Rather, these six expectations can be seen as
characteristics of a hypothetical society experiencing declining
crime rates.
The extent to which major institutions in the U.S. in the
1990s approximate this hypothetical society bears consideration.
I examine these six institutions in pairs, considering each of the
three traditional institutions along with each of the three major
corresponding institutional responses to the legitimacy crisis
experienced by the traditional institution: political-criminal jus-
tice, economic-welfare, family-education. In each section, I first
consider general connections between these institutions and
crime, and then examine postwar trends in the legitimacy of
each institution and how these trends have changed since 1990.
FIGURE 5.
EXPECTED LINKS BETWEEN INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY
AND DECREASING CRIME RATES.
Political trust Increasing
Criminal justice support Increasing




1. Political and Criminal Justice Institutions
The declining legitimacy of political institutions increases
crime in three main ways. First, individuals who perceive politi-
cal institutions to be unjust or unfair will be less motivated to
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follow rules and laws. Second, individuals in societies with
weaker political legitimacy will be less vigilant about controlling
the criminal and deviant behavior of others. And finally, socie-
ties with little political legitimacy will be less effective at protect-
ing their citizens from the criminal behavior of others. The
connections between political institutions and crime in the
postwar United States are most directly linked to the trust
Americans have had in their political institutions.32 Major in-
creases in support for formal criminal justice institutions have
reduced crime rates in the 1990s.
At the end of World War II, the U.S. entered a period in
which its citizens reported unprecedented levels of trust in the
honesty, fairness, and integrity of American political institu-
tions.33 There was widespread support for the war effort, high
levels of respect for politicians and judges, and enough popular
support to carry General Dwight D. Eisenhower, a military hero,
into the presidency in 1952.34 As a result of the low crime rates
associated with this high level of trust in government, per capita
spending on criminal justice institutions was lower in the years
following World War II than it would be for the next half cen-
tury.35
Levels of trust in political institutions began to erode sub-
stantially in the late 1950s and early 1960s.36 The civil rights
movement led the way by exposing long-standing racial injus-
tices in American society. Further erosion accompanied the di-
visive war in Vietnam, a series of widely publicized political
scandals, and the rights-based revolution that followed in the
wake of the civil rights movement. Moreover, because political
institutions are chiefly responsible for crime control, rising
32 1 use "trust" here in the usual sense of level of reliance on the equity, justice or
evenhandedness of others. See TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS
(Diego Gambetta ed., 1988).
"See generally ERiC GOLDMAN, THE CRUCIAL DECADE AND AFTER: AMERICA, 1945-1960.
' I&L at 236.
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS ON GOVERNMENTAL FINANCE
AND EMPLOYMENT 26-28 (1985).
JOHN MORTON BLUM, YEARS OF DISCORD: AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY, 1961-
1974, at 3-21 (1991).
3' FRANclS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERIY
50, 314-315 (1995).
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crime rates themselves further undermined political legiti-38
macy.
By the 1990s, the free fall in levels of political trust had
ended; in fact, there was some evidence of stability in the le-
gitimacy of American political institutions.3 9 While a full treat-
ment of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper, three
developments are especially important here. First, there are
important signs that overall levels of trust in government, while
very low compared to the early postwar period, have neverthe-
less been stable and perhaps even improving during the 1990s.40
Since 1958, a national election survey has collected biennial in-
formation on American attitudes toward government.41 For ex-
ample, for the past forty years, this survey has asked
respondents, "How much of the time can you trust the U.S. gov-
ernment to do what is right?" The proportion of Americans an-
swering "most of the time or just about always" peaked in 1964
atjust under 80%.42 The percentage who expressed confidence
in the federal government then declined rapidly during the
1960s and 1970s, scoring just over 25% in 1980. 43 But since
1980, the percentage who express trust in the federal govern-
ment has held steady and even begun to rise a bit.44 In fact, lev-
els of trust tapped by this measure were slightly higher in 1996
(just under 30.0%) than in 1980.4 Other measures of public
confidence in government tracked by the national election sur-
vey data provide similar evidence.46
Second, the rapid increase in crime rates in the early 1960s
coincided in large part with the rise of collective political action
associated especially with the civil rights movement and later,
'3 LAFREE, supra note 1, at 88.
9 WARREN E. MILLER, AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECrION STUDIES CUMULATIVE DATA
FILE, 1952-1996 (1996).
4 LAFREE, supra note 1, at 113.
SMILLER, supra note 39.




6I d. at 104.
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protests against the Vietnam War. For example, the total an-
nual number of race-related riots in America reached a postwar
zenith of 287 in 1968.8 Similarly, protests against the Vietnam
War became increasingly violent in the late 1960s. By contrast,
in the 1990s, there was no organized collective political action
that remotely resembled the scope of the civil rights movement
or the anti-war protests of the early and middle postwar periods.
And finally, as the legitimacy of political institutions de-
clined during the 1960s, the U.S. began to rely increasingly on
formal criminal justice institutions to maintain law and order.
Directly following World War II, Americans spent only $255 a
year (in inflation adjusted dollars) on all levels of federal, state,
and local law enforcement.49 They spent a little over $100 a year
at all governmental levels for corrections.5 0 By the early 1990s,
per capita spending on police had increased seven-fold and per
capita spending on corrections had increased nearly twelve-
fold.51
The impact of these developments is perhaps clearest with
regard to incarceration rates. From the end of World War II
until the mid-1970s, imprisonment rates in the United States
hovered around one hundred prisoners per 100,000 U.S. resi-
dents.52 In fact, imprisonment rates in 1973 were about the
same as they had been in 1946.5s But these rates began to
change rapidly thereafter. From 1974 to 1996, U.S. imprison-
ment rates more than quadrupled, reaching a century high of
427 per 100,000 residents.5 4 These increases have been particu-
7 Gary LaFree & Kriss A. Drass, African American Collective Action and Crime, 1955-91,
75 Soc. FORCES 835 (1997).
LAFREE, supra note 1, at 110.
" U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, No. GC77(6)-4, HISTORICAL STATISTICS ON
GOVERNMENTAL FINANCE AND EMPLOYMENT 29 (1979).
50 rd
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SERIES GF/92-5, SUMMARY 1, GOVERNMENT FINANCES:
1991-92 (1996).
5' U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS
1996, at 518 (1997).
5 3LAFREE, supra note 1, at 166.
s
4U.S. BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, PmSONERS IN 1996, at 1 (1997).
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larly sharp in the 1990s. From 1990 to 1996 alone, imprison-
ment rates increased by 43.8%.
5
By 1995, an estimated 5.4 million Americans were under
correctional supervision, including 1.1 million in prisons, one-
half million in jails, 700,000 on parole, and more than 3 million
56
on probation. Freeman provides the startling conclusion that
by 1995, the number of American men under the supervision of
corrections had surpassed the total number of unemployed
men. While much research confirms that informal social con-
trol is generally more effective than formal controls such as im-
prisonment in reducing crime,-" nevertheless, increases in
formal sanctions of this magnitude have undoubtedly damp-
ened U.S. crime rates in the 1990s.5 9
2. Economic and Welfare Institutions and Crime
Declining economic legitimacy increases street crime rates
in two main ways: raising the motivation of potential offenders
to commit crime, and reducing the effectiveness of social con-
trol aimed at crime prevention and punishment. Conversely,
spending on social welfare programs should reduce the motiva-
tion of potential offenders to commit crime and more generally,
improve the effectiveness of social control mechanisms.
Perhaps the most obvious connection between economic
legitimacy and criminal motivation is captured by the prosaic
observation that compared to the more well-to-do, those with
less property and wealth simply have more to gain by commit-
ting crime. The idea that economic deprivation increases
criminal motivation has long been central to strain theories in
U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1995, at 5 (1997).
-1 Richard B. Freeman, The Labor Market, in CRIME 172 (J.Q. Wilson & J. Petersilia
eds., 1995).
For a classic statement, see generally JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTIONTO TE
PRINCIPLES O MORALS AND LEGISLATION 134-36 (The Athlone Press 1970) (1789).
" For a comprehensive review of the empirical literature, see Thomas B. Marvell &




criminology.6 A large number of studies confirm that, com-
pared to the wealthy, the economically disadvantaged are more
likely to commit street crimes of every type."
While most criminology research on the link between eco-
nomic legitimacy and crime has focussed on its impact on the
offender's motivation, the declining legitimacy of economic in-
stitutions may also reduce the effectiveness of informal and
formal social control. Those who believe that economic institu-
tions are unfair or unjust might be reasonably expected to have
less interest in helping to control or regulate the criminal be-
havior of others.
I argue that the growing strains the economy imposed on
Americans directly weakened the legitimacy of economic institu-
tions in the postwar U.S.62  These strains were increasingly
shaped by global economic trends. At the end of World War II,
the U.S. entered an era of unprecedented economic prosper-
ity.63 The war jolted the U.S. economy out of a devastating de-
pression and matched the undamaged industrial plants of the
U.S. against the war-torn factories of Europe and Japan. Amer-
ica became a supermarket to the world.
But the economic picture had changed considerably by the
late 1960s. Basic industrial production dominated by the
United States following World War II was among the first areas
to suffer-the United States' lead in textiles, iron, steel, and
chemicals greatly diminished. 64 Seeking higher profits and less
competition, U.S. companies increasingly "outsourced" high-
See RICHARD CLOwARD & LLOYD OHLIN, DELINQUENCY AND OPPORTUNITY: A
THEORY OF DELINQUENT GANGS (1961); ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORYAND SOCIAL
STRuCTuRE (1957).
6" See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INEQUALrTy, CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY (1979); JOHN P.
HEwnT, SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND DEVIANT BEHAVIOR (1970); ROGER HOOD &
RICHARD SPARKS, KEY ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY (1970). But see, Charles R. Tittle et al.,
The Myth of Social Class and Criminality: An Empirical Assessment of the Empirical Evidence,
43 AM. Soc. REV. 643-56 (1978).62 LAFREE, supra note 1, at 114-34; Gary LaFree & Kriss A. Drass, The Effect of Changes
in Intraracial Income Inequality and Educational Attainment on Changes in Arrest Rates for
African Americans and Whites, 1957 to 1990, 61 AM. Soc. REv. 614, 615-17 (1996).
6 See FRANK LEVY, DOLLAS AND DREAMS (1987); IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, AFTER
LIBERALISM (1995).
" DENNY BRAUN, THE RICH GET RICHER: THE RISE OF INCOME INEQUALITY IN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD (1991).
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paying industrial jobs in these areas to lower-wage nations.0 As
economic changes accelerated, the influence of labor unions
steadily declined, and the high wages associated with unions
also eroded.6 Changes that began in traditional manufacturing
and production areas eventually spread to other parts of the
economy. The U.S. encountered increasingly stiff competition
even in newer, high technology industries that it once virtually
monopolized, like robotics, aerospace, and computers.67 During
the 1960s and 1970s, economic inequality grew substantially, in-
flation reached new heights, and corporate downsizing resulted
in thousands of closures and firings.&
The U.S. responded in part to these growing economic
strains by investing more in welfare support. In 1948, total wel-
fare spending amounted to $83 per capita (in 1995 dollars).69
Spending rates increased only slightly during the early postwar
period, reaching $116 per capita in 1960.70 But from the mid-
1960s to the late 1970s, increases in welfare spending were
rapid. From 1964 to 1978 alone, total per capita welfare spend-
ing (again, in 1995 dollars) more than quadrupled-from $121
71per year to $551 dollars per year.
To fit my arguments about the connections between crime
and social institutions, I am looking for evidence that both eco-
nomic well-being and the support of welfare institutions in-
creased during the 1990s. Indeed, the economic situation for
the United States has shown unmistakable signs of improvement
in the last decade of the twentieth century. In 1996, the federal
See BARRY BLUESTONE & BENNETT HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIAUZATION OF
AMERICA (1982).
See generally SAMUEL BOWLES ET AL., AFTER THE WASTELAND: A DEMOCRATIC
ECONOMICS FOR THE YEAR 2000 (1990); MIn DAVIS, PRISONERS OF THE AMERICAN
DREAM: POLITICS AND ECONOMYIN THE HISTORY OF THE U.S. WORKING CLASS (1986).
67 See generally EAmONN FINGLErON, BLINDSME: WHY JAPAN IS STILL ON TRACK TO
OVERTAKE THE U.S. BYTHEYEAR 2000 (1995).63See generally BLUESTONE & HARRISON, supra note 65.
69 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS ON GOVERNMENTAL FINANCE
AND EMPLOYMENT 26-28 (1985).
70Id




spending deficit reached its lowest level since 1979.72 In 1994,
the poverty rate began to fall for the first time in five years and
income inequality began a modest decline.7 3 In 1997, unem-
ployment reached its lowest level since 1973.74 After reaching
double digits in the 1970s and early 1980s, inflation cooled off
again during the 1990s, remaining under 3.0% from 1990 to
1996.75
Changes in the welfare laws may at first seem to contradict
the argument that the 1990s' downturn in crime in the U.S. is
related in part to higher levels of welfare spending. Thus, in
1996, Congress replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) and several other long-established programs
with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) pro-
76gram. The new law sets up a system of block grants to the
states, mandates that federal funding for TANF programs be
capped at $16.4 billion annually through the year 2002, and
stipulates that recipients can only receive TANF benefits for a
maximum of five years. However, because of the way these
changes are being phased in, it is still too early to tell what im-
pact if any they will have on street crime rates. Program caps
and limits on participation may not have major effects on re-
cipients for several years. Moreover, as noted above, recent
changes in the welfare system have been implemented during a
period when the economy has been relatively strong.
3. Family and Educational Institutions and Crime
As with political and economic institutions, family institu-
tions can reduce crime by regulating the motivation of offend-
ers and by providing social control. In addition, the family can
play a special role in protecting its members from the criminal
activity of others. Throughout human history, families have
72 UNITED STATES ECONOMIC REPORT TO THE PRESiDENT 20 (1997).
74 Im
76 Jerry Watts, The End of Work and the End of Welfare, 26 CONTEMP. Soc. 409, 409-12
(1997).
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been the primary institution for passing social rules and values
from one generation to the next.8 With few exceptions, chil-
dren have more frequent and longer contacts with family mem-
bers than with others, and family contacts are generally earlier
and more emotionally intense than other contacts." The family
has long been the institution with major responsibility for teach-
ing children right from wrong, instilling moral values, and em-
phasizing the importance of law-abiding behavior. This
socialization role of the family means that it is critical for train-
ing children to respect and abide by criminal laws.
Families also control crime by directly regulating the behav-
ior of their members. Families may limit the delinquent behav-
ior of their children by restricting their activities, maintaining
actual physical surveillance over them, and knowing their
whereabouts when they are out of sight.s° But perhaps even
more importantly, families often control the behavior of chil-
dren simply by commanding their love and respect. A good
deal of research confirms that children who care about their
families will be more likely to avoid behavior that they know may
result in shame, embarrassment, or inconvenience for family
members.8'
Families are also an important crime-reducing agent in
terms of the guardianship that they provide their members.
Thus, families may reduce the criminal victimization of family
members by protecting them from property crimes such as bur-
glary and theft, and also by shielding them from the potential
physical harm of unwanted suitors, and would-be molesters,
muggers, and rapists.
Beginning especially in the 1960s, there were major declines
in the legitimacy of the traditional two-parent, male-dominated
family in America. Two related processes were especially impor-
tant. The first was a growing challenge to the traditional form
78 KINGSLEYDAVIS,HuMAN SoCIETY 395 (1948).
James S. Coleman, The Rational Reconstruction of Society, 58 AM. Soc. REV. 2
(1993).80 Travis Hirschi, The Family, in CRIME 128 (J.Q. Wilson &J. Petersilia eds., 1995).
8, See, eg. id. at 128; JOHN BRArrTwArrE, CRIME, SHAME AND REiNTEGRATION 48
(1989).
1, Hirschi, supra note 80, at 129.
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of the family.83 As the feminist movement gained momentum in
the 1960s, an increasing number of people came to regard the
traditional two-parent family as a bastion of male oppression
and dominance.8s Occurring almost simultaneously and related
in complex ways was a growing movement toward greater sexual
freedom and experimentation outside of marriage.8s In re-
sponse to these developments, there was an explosion of alter-
natives to traditional family living arrangements.
Although it is important not to overstate the homogeneity
of the American family directly following World War II,86 the ag-
gregate changes were nevertheless substantial. In the 1950s, di-
vorce rates were lower than they would be for the next fifty years
and the proportion of American households containing indi-
viduals with no family connections hovered around 10.0%.87 Af
ter the 1960s, rates of divorce, children born to unmarried
parents, and single-parent families rapidly increased and the to-
tal number of Americans living entirely outside of families sky-
rocketed.88
Revolutionary changes in the economy also contributed to
the declining legitimacy of the traditional American family.
Three developments are especially important here: First, the
steady movement of men away from agricultural labor at home
to positions in the paid labor force, which had already begun in
earnest during the industrial revolution, continued to gain
momentum during the postwar period. 9  Second, women
joined the paid labor force in record numbers during the post-
83 See, e.g., DAVID POPENOE, DISTURBING THE NEST: FAMILY CHANGE AND DECLINE IN
MODERN SOCIETY 51 (1988).
8 For the classic statement of this view, see BETTYFRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE
(1963); see also KATE MILLET, SEXUAL POLITICS (1970).
' For a general discussion, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE:
LAW, AUTHORInYAND CULTURE (1990).
"6 For a discussion of stereotypical thinking about the past forms of families, see
STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILES AND THE NOSTALGIA
TRAP (1992).
87 LAFREE, supra note 1, at 141-44.
8Id,
89 Coleman, supra note 79, at 3.
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war years.9 And finally, the amount of time children and young
adults spent in schools rapidly accelerated.9 1 These changes
have totally restructured the American family.
To summarize, the institutionalized model of a two-parent
family with a husband working for pay and a wife running the
household became far less common in America during the
postwar period. These changes have been complex and can be
measured in a variety of ways. However, they all lead to the
same general conclusion: during the postwar period, the legiti-
macy of the traditional family declined enormously. Moreover,
the new forms of family and nonfamily living that increasingly
replaced it have thus far not developed the same levels of le-
gitimacy that the traditional family enjoyed during the early
postwar period.
However, at least two developments in the 1990s may be
changing the long-term relationship between declining family
institutions and crime rates. First, nearly three decades have
now passed since the most rapid changes in family organization
began. Blended, dual career, male household manager, single
parent, and even gay family forms are becoming increasingly in-
stitutionalized. As these alternatives to the traditional family
become routinized, their ability to prevent crime and deviance
should increase.
Second, as the legitimacy of traditional family institutions
continues to decline in the U.S., Americans have relied increas-
ingly on educational institutions to perform responsibilities that
were once performed by families. These changes have been
nothing short of revolutionary. From 1990 to 1995 alone, the
proportion of three and four year olds enrolled in public, paro-
chial or other private schools jumped from 44.0% to nearly
49.0%.92 During the same period, the proportion of fourteen-
to seventeen-year-olds enrolled in school topped 96.0%, the
proportion of eighteen and nineteen-year-olds in school
SHIRLEY P. BURGGRAF, THE FEMININE ECONOMY AND ECONOMIC MAN: REVIVING THE
ROLE OF FAMILY IN THE POST-INDUSTRIAL AGE 18 (1997).
91 Coleman, supra note 79, at 6-7.
NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION
STATISTICS 1996, at 15 (1997).
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reached 59.4%, and the total proportion of young adults twenty
to twenty-four-years-old reached 31.5%. 93
Schools, like families, can discourage crime by reducing
criminal motivation, by increasing the effectiveness of social
control, and, in principle at least, by protecting students from
the criminal behavior of others. There is a well-known tendency
for offenders to be drawn from those with low levels of educa-
tional attainment.94 There is also evidence that juveniles who
accept the legitimacy of education and who have high educa-
tional aspirations and long term educational goals are less likely
to engage in delinquency.95 Schools can reduce crime by effec-
tively monitoring and supervising the behavior of children un-
der their custody.96 More generally, research also shows that
juveniles are less likely to commit crime when they are strongly
attached to school97 and when their performance in school is
strong.98
Educational institutions have obviously not replaced family
functions in America. Indeed, we could argue that educational
institutions have steadfastly resisted expanding their responsi-
bilities from the relatively narrow role of education established
in the Nineteenth Century.? Nevertheless, a growing propor-
tion of infants, children, young adults, and even adults are
spending much of their waking hours in schools. Taken to-
gether, this growing participation in educational institutions
should put downward pressure on crime rates.
9, IdL
9 See DELBERT S. EnoTr & HARWIN L. Voss, DEUNQUENCY AND DROPOUT 119
(1974).
" See, e.g., Josefina Figueira-McDonough, Feminism and Delinquency, 24 BRrr. J. OF
CRIMINOLOGY 325 (1984); Allen E. Liska, Aspirations, Expectations and Delinquency. Stress
and Additive Models, 12 SOC. Q. 99 (1971).
'6Jackson Toby, The Schools, in CRIME, supra note 80, at 152-58.97 See generally BRArHWAITE, supra note 81, at 28-29.
9See, e.g., Robert Agnew, A Revised Strain Theory of Delinquency, 64 SOC. FORCES 151
(1985).
"LAFREE, supra note 1, at 185-86.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
U.S. street crime trends in the 1990s can be accurately de-
scribed as a bust. It is possible that the recent declines in crime
were related to the renewed legitimacy of three traditional, and
the growing support for three newer, social institutions during
the last decade of the twentieth century. Declining crime rates
in the 1990s may have been produced by increasing trust in po-
litical institutions, increasing economic well-being, and growing
institutionalization of alternatives to the traditional two parent
American family. Increasing support for criminal justice, wel-
fare, and educational institutions in the 1990s has also put
downward pressure on crime rates.
Among the roles of social science, prediction is among the
most precarious. If crime rates continue to drop during the last
few years of the twentieth century, then history will likely inter-
pret the 1990s as a period of major crime declines in the United
States. If, on the other hand, crime rates again begin to in-
crease over the next few years, the first half of the 1990s will
more closely resemble the early 1980s-a period when most
street crime rates faltered before heading upward again. Still,
taken together, the evidence suggests that the U.S. is currently
experiencing the most broad-gauged and extensive drop in
street crime rates in the past half century.
How reliable is the evidence that these recent crime de-
clines are related to the growing strength of the six institutions
described here? The evidence is strongest for a connection be-
tween declining crime rates in the 1990s and increased support
for criminal justice institutions, increased economic well-being,
and increased support for educational institutions. Rates of
criminal justice spending, imprisonment, and other forms of
punishments have never been higher and much of this increase
has happened in the 1990s. The economic condition of the
country appears to be more favorable in the mid 1990s than it
has been at any time since the oil embargo of 1973. And school
enrollments and education-related spending have continued to
increase unabated throughout the 1990s.
The connections between recent crime declines and politi-
cal, welfare, and family institutions must be regarded as some-
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what more tentative. Still, there is good evidence that public
trust in political institutions is not experiencing the rapid de-
clines that were common in the 1960s and 1970s. And it is
clearly the case that there are currently no political protest
movements in the U.S. with anything close to the level of inten-
sity or commitment reached by the civil rights movement or the
anti-Vietnam War protests. Changes in welfare support in 1996
may prove to be consequential, but their effects on crime rates
can reasonably be expected to occur later, when automatic
spending limitations are encountered. While there are few
signs that family institutions are returning to the form they took
in the 1950s, there are clear indications that family arrange-
ments that would have been regarded with horror in the years
directly following World War II, have now gathered much
greater acceptance.
While any firm conclusions about the exact relations be-
tween these institutions and crime trends in the 1990s must
await a far more detailed empirical analysis, institutions such as
those examined here do seem to provide promising leads in our
ongoing efforts to understand the crime bust of the 1990s.
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